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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
The United States government appeals the sentences of 
David Yeaman and Nolan Mendenhall on several counts of 
mail and wire fraud. We reversed the original sentences of 
both defendants following a previous gover nment appeal, 
finding that the District Court had failed to apply the 
Sentencing Guidelines properly. United States v. Yeaman, 
194 F.3d 442, 465 (3d Cir. 1999). At r esentencing, the 
District Court departed downward 17 levels for Yeaman and 
16 levels for Mendenhall primarily because both defendants 
had already completed erroneously lenient sentences. The 
downward departures granted by the District Court 
resulted in no additional incarceration. W e conclude that 
the District Court has again erred, and we will again 
remand for resentencing. 
 
I. 
 
David Yeaman and Nolan Mendenhall wer e convicted on 
several counts of mail and wire fraud arising from their 
participation in a fraudulent scheme involving the sale of 
worthless reinsurance. The details of the scheme are set 
forth in our opinion in United States v. Y eaman, 194 F.3d 
442, 446-49 (3d Cir. 1999). Briefly stated, the convictions of 
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Yeaman and Mendenhall stemmed from their leasing 
worthless stocks as assets available to pay insurance 
claims. When these assets were called upon to pay 
outstanding medical reinsurance claims, the scheme was 
uncovered. David Yeaman leased stocks which were 
purported to be valued at over $12 million but wer e in fact 
practically worthless. Mendenhall assisted Y eaman in 
leasing these falsely-valued stocks and ran the day-to-day 
operations of the scheme. Id. 
 
Yeaman was convicted by a jury in 1997 of conspiracy to 
commit securities fraud and wire fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 371, five counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1343, and three counts of securities fraud, in 
violation of 15 U.S.C. S 77q(a). Mendenhall was convicted of 
four counts of securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. 
S 77q(a). Three co-defendants wer e also convicted at trial, 
while a sixth co-defendant pled guilty and testified against 
the other defendants. 
 
At its first sentencing hearing on January 28, 1998, the 
District Court sentenced Yeaman to 14 months 
imprisonment and Mendenhall to three years pr obation, 
with Mendenhall's first 10 months to be served in 
community confinement. The defendants appealed these 
sentences and the government cross-appealed. On appeal, 
this Court remanded for resentencing, holding, inter alia, 
that the District Court had erred by finding that no loss 
had occurred. On remand, Yeaman and the government 
agreed to a modified offense level of 30, based on the $4.5 
million loss incurred and other factors. This produced a 
sentencing range of 97 to 121 months for Yeaman, a range 
mandating a sentence 83 months (roughly 7 years) longer 
than his prior sentence. Mendenhall and the gover nment 
agreed to an offense level of 26, also based on the loss and 
other factors. This produced a sentence range of 63 to 78 
months, in comparison to a previous sentence r equiring no 
jail time, but only community confinement. 
 
At the resentencing hearing on April 10, 2000, the 
District Court found that these ranges were appropriate 
and that they were supported by the facts. The District 
Court then departed downward 17 levels for Y eaman and 
16 levels for Mendenhall in order to re-impose its original 
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sentences. Before either party had addr essed the merits, 
the District Court made clear its intention to avoid 
imposing any punishment beyond the original sentences. 
 
       Let me say at the outset that this is an unusual 
       situation in that we have two defendants her e who had 
       been sentenced previously and who were each 
       sentenced to periods of incarceration which they 
       entered upon and completed and served and then 
       entered upon their supervised release and their 
       resumption of their civilian pursuits. 
 
        . . . 
 
       I must say, in all candor, that my view of this is that, 
       as a judge, if he were in a position of applying justice 
       and mercy, as it's traditionally been known, would feel 
       that after this long delay, it is almost unconscionable 
       to send these two defendants back to prison. 
 
(App. 162a-66a). 
 
After hearing arguments by the government and both 
defendants, the District Court re-imposed its original 
sentences. 
 
II. 
 
The parties have suggested four bases for the District 
Court's downward departures: extraor dinary rehabilitation, 
disparity in sentencing among similarly situated co- 
defendants, extraordinary family circumstances, and re- 
incarceration after completion of a sentence. The 
government argues that on the facts of this case, a 
departure based on any of the above factors is 
unwarranted. 
 
"We review a district court's decision to depart from the 
applicable Guidelines range under an abuse of discr etion 
standard . . .." United States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 100 
(3d Cir. 2000), citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 
(1996). "Our review is limited to ensuring that the 
circumstances relied upon by the District Court are not `so 
far removed from those found exceptional in existing case 
law that the sentencing court may be said to be acting 
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outside permissible limits.' " United States v. Serafini, 233 
F.3d 758, 772 (3d Cir. 2000) quoting Sweeting, 213 F.3d at 
100. 
 
However, we also note that "whether a factor is a 
permissible basis for departure under any circumstances is 
a question of law, and the court of appeals need not defer 
to the district court's resolution of the point." Koon, 518 
U.S. at 100. Thus, while we owe deference to the District 
Court's interpretation of the facts warranting departure in 
this case, we may correct the District Court's legal error if 
we find that it has departed based on a factor which would 
not warrant departure under any circumstances. 
 
1. Extraordinary Rehabilitation 
 
In United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1997), we 
held that "post-offense rehabilitation efforts, including 
those which occur post-conviction, may constitute a 
sufficient factor warranting a downward departure provided 
that the efforts are so exceptional as to remove the 
particular case from the heartland in which the acceptance 
of responsibility guideline was intended to apply." Id. at 80. 
(Emphasis is original). These rehabilitation ef forts must be 
remarkable, "indicate real, positive behavioral change," and 
demonstrate the defendant's "commitment to r epair and 
rebuild" his or her life. Id. at 81; see also United States v. 
Hancock, 95 F. Supp. 2d 280, 287 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(declining to grant a Sally departur e based on defendant's 
post-offense work record, wher e defendant was a college 
graduate and held noteworthy employment prior to arr est); 
United States v. Kane, 88 F. Supp. 2d 408, 409 (E.D. Pa. 
2000) (noting it is inappropriate to grant a departure where 
the defendant simply engages in good conduct consistent 
with pre-offense activities). 
 
Though the District Court did not explicitly state it was 
departing downward on the basis of extraor dinary 
rehabilitation, it is clear that the court was aware that 
extraordinary rehabilitation was an available basis for 
departure pursuant to our decision in Sally . The District 
Court did state that "the record of both individuals while in 
custody was exemplary and reflected a concentrated 
attitude of rehabilitation and cooperation" and that 
 
                                5 
  
"additional imprisonment would result in disruption of their 
rehabilitative efforts." 
 
The government notes that the most recent version of the 
Sentencing Guidelines has been amended to forbid 
expressly downward departures based on post-sentencing 
rehabilitation. The Sentencing Commission deter mined that 
such departures were inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. S 3624(b) 
(providing for sentence reductions due to good behavior) 
and impermissibly benefitted only those who were granted 
resentencing de novo. U.S.S.G. S 5K2.19. We note that the 
amended guidelines were not effective at the time of the 
sentencing of these defendants and that they work a 
departure from our previous interpr etation of U.S.S.G. 
S 5K2.19 in Sally. They are ther efore a substantive 
amendment, rather than a clarification of U.S.S.G. 
S 5K2.19. See U.S. v. Bertoli, 40 F .3d 1384, 1407 n.21 (3d. 
Cir. 1994) (stating that this Court's interpr etation of the 
pre-amendment language is the controlling factor in 
determining whether an amendment is mer ely "clarifying."). 
We, therefore, conclude that a Sally departure is available, 
at least in theory, to these defendants. 
 
It is clear from the record befor e us, however, that the 
defendants here are not eligible for a Sally departure. 
Neither Yeaman or Mendenhall has intr oduced evidence of 
extraordinary rehabilitation. Mendenhall's three proffered 
examples of rehabilitation are not significant. First, 
Mendenhall's parole officer stated that his behavior was 
"likely aberrant and not likely to be repeated." Second, 
Mendenhall points out that he is attempting to become an 
architect. Third, after being released from community 
confinement, Mendenhall sought counseling fr om a police 
lieutenant. 
 
The statement of the parole officer har dly amounts to 
evidence of extraordinary rehabilitation, and Mendenhall's 
career change is not at all surprising, as he has a Master's 
Degree in architecture and would pr esumably have faced 
difficulty obtaining employment in the securities industry 
subsequent to his conviction. The only evidence that speaks 
to rehabilitation at all is Mendenhall's pursuit of 
counseling. Pursuit of counseling is included as a factor 
weighing toward proof of acceptance of r esponsibility under 
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U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1. The fact that it is a factor weighing in 
favor of a guideline-based departure makes it clear that 
standing alone, it is not "extraordinary" unless there is 
some evidence that it was somehow present to an 
extraordinary degree in this case. No such evidence is 
present in the record. Accordingly, we can find no basis in 
the record supporting a Sally departure for Mendenhall as 
he has pointed to nothing "remarkable" or"exceptional" in 
his rehabilitation as is required by our jurisprudence. 
 
Turning to Yeaman, the recor d makes clear that he 
learned Spanish, participated in the prison choir, tutored 
other inmates, and generally behaved as a "model prisoner." 
As a reward for this good behavior , Yeaman was released 
early from his confinement at Nellis Prison Federal Prison 
Camp and transferred to community confinement to serve 
the last few months of his original sentence. While 
Yeaman's activities, especially the tutoring of fellow 
inmates, were commendable, they do not support a finding 
of extraordinary rehabilitation. Befor e his original 
sentencing, Mr. Yeaman made clear that he is an individual 
with strong religious convictions who would not be inclined 
to engage in unlawful activity in the future. 1 Yeaman's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Relatedly, we note the following statement by the District Court: 
 
       Since [defendants'] release they have, by all accounts, been model, 
       productive citizens, resulting in numer ous letters of support from 
       relatives, friends, employers and community members. Any 
       additional imprisonment would result in disruption of their 
       rehabilitative efforts, their relationships with family members, 
which 
       have been strained and are now being str engthened, and would 
       cause substantial economic hardship on the defendants and their 
       families. 
 
        The letters mentioned were made part of the appendix, 
       presumably in support of Yeaman's claim of extraordinary 
       rehabilitation. The majority of these letters simply indicate that 
       Yeaman's family and community believe he is a good person and 
       believe he has been punished sufficiently. Such sentiments, though 
       attesting to Yeaman's many admirable qualities, do not form an 
       adequate basis for downward departure under the Sentencing 
       Guidelines. Accord U.S.S.G. S 5H1.6 (stating that community ties 
are 
       ordinarily irrelevant to sentencing); United States v. Rybicki, 96 
F.3d 
       754, 758 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that personal worthiness does not 
       constitute a valid basis for downward departur e); cf. United 
States v. 
       Serafini, 233 F.3d at 763 (exceptional civic and charitable 
       contributions may form a basis for departur e). 
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behavior subsequent to sentencing confirms this fact but 
also makes it clear that Yeaman's conduct has not changed 
significantly and could have been reasonably expected 
based on his previous behavior. Insofar as the District 
Court concluded that extraordinary rehabilitation occurred 
in Yeaman's case, it abused its discr etion. There is nothing 
about Yeaman's post-sentencing conduct that sets it 
outside the heartland and makes it a basis for a Sally 
departure.2 
 
2. Sentencing Disparity 
 
The District Court stated that "imposing what is 
concededly a substantial downward departur e . . . would 
tend to make the sentences more compatible with the 
defendant's other cohorts in this scheme for which the 
defendants have been found guilty, and would mor e fairly 
level the playing field." The defendants suggest that the 
District Court departed downward on the basis of 
sentencing disparity. 
 
We are not certain that the defendants have read the 
District Court's statement correctly. It is possible that the 
District Court was merely observing an ef fect of its 
downward departure rather than providing an additional 
basis for the departure. If it were true that this were a basis 
for departure, however, we would not be able to sustain 
such a basis on these facts. The record makes it clear that 
two of the defendant's cohorts received sentences more 
severe than those properly applicable to Y eaman and 
Mendenhall.3 Additionally, the government makes a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Yeaman's counsel argues that United States v. Green, 152 F.3d 1202 
(9th Cir. 1998) is nearly on all fours supporting a downward departure. 
Green involved a 14-level downwar d departure for a person convicted of 
a marijuana-related offense in Califor nia, who served 3000 hours of 
community service, and in addition made himself"available for daily 
tutoring, weekend special events, out therapy pr ogram, and was 
instrumental in starting Saturday computer training programs." Id. at 
1208. This kind of involvement might be seen as extraordinary and is 
distinguishable from Yeaman's conduct, which does not demonstrate 
extraordinary initiative or change  in behavior. 
 
3. Alan Teale pled guilty and was sentenced to seven years in 
Pennsylvania, and then ten years consecutively in Alabama. He died in 
prison. Charlotte Rentz pled guilty and was sentenced to six years in 
Pennsylvania and an additional seven years in Alabama. 
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compelling argument that the variation in sentences 
between the defendants here and their co-defendants may 
be explained by the fact that all co-defendants pr esented by 
the defendants pled guilty and many of them cooperated 
with the government's investigation and pr osecution. 
Generally, disparities in sentences among similarly situated 
defendants do not constitute a valid basis for downward 
departure in the absence of any proof of prosecutorial 
misconduct. United States v. Higgins, 967 F .2d 841, 845 
(3d Cir. 1992). In fact, several other cir cuits have rejected 
challenges to shorter sentences for similarly situated co- 
defendants when the shorter sentences were a r esult of 
plea bargaining or government assistance. See, e.g., United 
States v. Epley, 52 F.3d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 582-83 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 
We have held that a manipulation of an indictment by the 
prosecution may provide a basis for a downward departure. 
See United States v. Lieberman, 971 F .2d 989, 998-99 (3d 
Cir. 1992). Although Yeaman and Mendenhall suggest many 
inconsistencies between their sentences and the sentences 
of their co-defendants, their arguments ar e based on an 
ambiguous comment by the District Court that makes no 
reference to specific facts. Lacking anyfindings of fact from 
the District Court as to which co-defendants wer e similarly 
situated and how the government committed pr osecutorial 
misconduct, it is impossible for us to deter mine if and why 
the District Court intended to depart downwar d on the 
basis that some sentences were dissimilar . In the absence 
of any factual findings of specific disparities or 
prosecutorial misconduct, the departures challenged by the 
government cannot be sustained on the basis of sentencing 
disparity. 
 
3. Family Circumstances 
 
We note briefly that the District Court stated that 
reincarceration would result in "disruption of . . . 
[defendants'] relationships with family members, which 
have been strained and are now being str engthened" and 
"substantial economic hardship on . . .[defendants'] 
families." This suggests to us that family cir cumstances 
may have constituted a basis for the District Court's 
downward departure. Our opinion in United States v. 
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Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2000), recognizes this basis 
for downward departure outside the Guidelines, but it also 
forecloses the possibility of any such departur e on this 
record. See id. at 102 (stating that family disruption is a 
normal consequence of incarceration). In Sweeting, we 
denied a downward departure on the basis of extraordinary 
family circumstances to a single mother withfive children, 
one of whom had a psychological impairment. See id. at 96- 
98. The evidence of extraordinary family cir cumstances in 
this case does not rise to the level that we found 
inadequate in Sweeting. We will not discuss the issue 
further, as Mendenhall does not urge this basis upon us 
and Yeaman specifically argues that family circumstances 
were not a basis the District Court's decision. 
 
4. Re-Incarceration 
 
       A. Validity of Downward Departur e on this Factor 
 
This leaves re-incarceration as the only possible basis for 
sustaining the District Court's downward departure.4 
Sentencing took place on January 22, 1998 and 
Mendenhall and Yeaman began to serve their sentences 
within three months of that date. Resentencing took place 
on April 10, 2000. At that time, Mendenhall had been 
released from community confinement and had been living 
with his family (on probation) for a period of roughly 16 
months. Yeaman had served ten months in a federal prison 
camp and a brief term of community confinement and had 
been free for over a year. The District Court specifically 
departed downward on the basis that Yeaman and 
Mendenhall had served their original sentences, and that it 
would be "cruel" to return the defendants to prison 
following the completion of their original sentences.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The defendants claim the government has waived any objection to 
reincarceration as a basis for downwar d departure, because the 
government, in several instances, acknowledged that the circumstances 
of this case were unique or unusual. We have found multiple instances 
in the record where the gover nment made clear that it is opposed any 
downward departure in this situation. The government does not, 
however, contest the theoretical possibility of a downward departures 
based on reincarceration in some other factual situation. 
 
5. Again we observe that Mendenhall was never incarcerated, but served 
10 months in community confinement. 
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Yeaman's counsel argues that we "should affirm Mr. 
Yeaman's sentence on [re-incar ceration] alone, and need 
not address the other bases for departur e." Appellee's Br. at 
31. 
 
A court may depart from the guidelines sentence if "there 
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, 
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by 
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines 
that should result in a sentence differ ent from that 
described." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 (1997). Departures should be 
"highly infrequent," Koon, 518 U.S. at 96; see also Serafini, 
at *57 (Rosenn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part) ("Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not 
exist except as an area left open by a surr ounding belt of 
restriction," citing Ronald Dworkin, T aking Rights Seriously 
31 (1977)). 
 
The Supreme Court has endorsed a four-step test for 
determining whether a departure fr om the Guidelines 
should occur based on unusual circumstances. See Koon, 
518 U.S. at 95. First, we determine if the factor relied upon 
in the case makes it special or unusual, taking it outside 
the heartland. Second, we determine whether departures 
on such factors have been forbidden by the Commission. 
Third, we determine whether the Commission has 
encouraged departures based on such factors. Fourth, we 
determine whether the Commission has discouraged 
departures based on such factors. Id. 
 
We conclude that the claims of Yeaman and Mendenhall 
stumble on the first step of Koon. The defendants here 
present no unusual circumstances that move their 
situation outside the heartland. The Sentencing Guidelines 
promote two central Congressional objectives. First, they 
promote a vertical sentencing uniformity by identifying an 
appropriate sentencing range for any given crime in light of 
the goals of sentencing. Second, they promote a horizontal 
uniformity in sentencing by requiring that similarly 
situated defendants are sentenced similarly. See U.S.S.G. 
Ch. 1. Pt. A. P 3 (policy statement). Under the Guidelines 
scheme, the calculated sentence is presumed to be the 
standard sentence for typical cases within the"heartland." 
As the lower end of the sentencing range cannot be bridged 
 
                                11 
  
without some basis for downward departur e, we can 
conclude that it must identify the minimum sentence 
required in the heartland case to satisfy the goals of general 
deterrence, specific deterrence, r etribution, and 
rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a) (setting forth the 
goals of sentencing). 
 
In a system administered by human beings, err ors are 
inevitable.6 Errors under the Sentencing Guidelines result 
in breaches of the intended uniformity, however, and error 
correction is essential to attaining the twin goals of the 
Guideline scheme. Accordingly, the Guidelines contemplate 
the correction of errors through appellate review. See 
U.S.S.G. Ch. 1 Pt. A. P 2; 18 U.S.C. S 3742(b)(2). The 
correction of errors in sentencing necessarily involves 
reincarceration in that class of cases where the sentence 
imposed was less than it should have been and as a r esult, 
the defendant has been released prior to the correction of 
the error. 
 
The District Court here held that reincar ceration in and 
of itself constitutes an aggravating or mitigating factor not 
adequately taken into account by the Guidelines scheme. 
We can not agree. Rather, r eincarceration as a means to 
correct error is inherent in the pr ocess of Guideline 
sentencing. Indeed, as we have indicated, the corr ection of 
error through reincarceration pr ovides the only means of 
preserving the appropriateness and unifor mity of 
sentencing. 
 
Accepting the District Court's view that err or correction 
through reincarceration places a case outside the heartland 
would require us to endorse the pr oposition that the 
original imposition of unduly lenient sentences can entitle 
defendants in Yeaman's and Mendenhall's positions to 
sentences that do not conform to the intended uniform 
pattern. Such an endorsement would not only be 
inequitable and inconsistent with Congressional intent, it 
would also produce the greatest deviation from the desired 
uniformity in those cases where the original errors are the 
most egregious. Permitting a downwar d departure to avoid 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, part ii, line 325 (1711) 
("To 
err is human . . .."). 
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reincarceration where an erroneously lenient sentence is 
successfully appealed would have the perverse ef fect of 
compounding judicial error. The mor e egregious the error of 
a District Court at an original sentencing, the mor e likely 
that error would become irreversible. If, for example, the 
District Court in this case had misinterpreted the proper 
guidelines sentence as requiring only four years 
imprisonment for each defendant, no departur e would have 
been available under the District Court's theory. Only when 
the error is most egregious does this theory support 
departure. We are especially hesitant to adopt a rule that 
creates such dubious inversions.7  
 
We hold only that error correction through 
reincarceration cannot alone take a case outside the 
heartland. We do not rule out the possibility that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In support of its view, the District Court made reference to this 
Court's opinion in United States v. Romualdi, 101 F.3d 971 (3d Cir. 
1996). In that case, we reversed an err oneous sentence of home 
confinement that should have been a sentence of three years 
incarceration. In the course of our opinion, we suggested that on remand 
the District Court might consider whether a departur e would be 
appropriate: 
 
       [W]e note that Romualdi has apparently completed his service of the 
       most stringent part of the sentence imposed by the district court, 
       i.e. home confinement for six months. On r emand, the district 
court 
       may want to consider whether this is a factor that would warrant 
       departure. 
 
Id. at 977. 
 
We read this language as suggesting that in the absence of any 
compensation under the guidelines for time err oneously served in home 
confinement, such confinement might possibly be credited to the 
defendant through a downward departur e mechanism at resentencing. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 3585 (b) (providing that a defendant shall be given credit 
toward the service of a term for any time spent previously in federal 
custody); Edwards v. United States, 41 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding 
that home confinement is not official detention for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 
S 3585(b)). 
 
Romauldi thus has no bearing on cases like the ones before us where 
the defendants will receive full credit for the time they have served and 
the sole issue is whether reincarceration for error correction can alone 
move the defendant's case outside the heartland. 
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extraordinary circumstances surrounding reincarceration 
or extraordinary effects of reincar ceration in a particular 
case may provide a basis for departure just as the 
circumstances and effects of an original incarceration, if 
sufficiently extraordinary, can constitute a basis for a 
downward departure. See United States v. Milikowsky, 65 
F.3d 4,7 (2d Cir. 1995) (downwar d departure to avoid 
incarceration warranted under "extraor dinary family 
circumstances" exception); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 
599, 605 (2d Cir. 1990) (downward departure for "extreme 
vulnerability" during incarceration). Y eaman and 
Mendenhall, however, present no extraor dinary 
circumstances or effects of reincar ceration moving their 
cases beyond the heartland. 
 
Under the Guidelines a sentence for Yeaman of at least 
eight years and one month and a sentence for Mendenhall 
of at least five years and three months ar e deemed 
necessary to serve the Congressionally declar ed objectives 
of sentencing and the goal of uniform tr eatment of similarly 
situated defendants. Any departure from those minima 
must be justified by extraordinary cir cumstances placing 
their cases beyond the heartland and must be consistent 
with the objectives of the Guidelines. U.S. v. Gomez-Villa, 59 
F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Ullyses-Salazar, 28 F.3d 
932 (9th Cir. 1994). We are unwilling to hold that the 
original imposition of unduly lenient sentences and the 
resulting necessity of reincarceration of the defendants 
following correction of those sentences can justify the 
fourteen month and ten month sentences here under 
review. 
 
III. 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and 
remand for resentencing in a manner consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
                                14 
  
NYGAARD, J., dissenting in part: 
 
I agree with my colleagues that the District Court erred 
by relying upon the sentencing disparities between 
appellants and their co-defendants as a basis for downward 
departure. Further, I reluctantly agree that re- 
incarceration, even where, as here, it is wholly unnecessary 
and antithetical to the historical purposes of criminal law 
and penology, in and of itself does not take this case out of 
the heartland. However, in contrast to the Majority, I do not 
think the District Court abused its discretion by departing 
downward on the basis of extraordinary r ehabilitation. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the District Court on this issue, 
but remand the cause for it to determine if the departure is 
reasonable on this basis alone. 
 
With respect to Mendenhall, the Majority contends that 
his three proffered examples of rehabilitation are not 
significant. Maj. Op. at 6. It finds nothing extraordinary 
about his conduct on parole, his career change, or his 
participation in counseling. I disagree with the Majority's 
characterization of Mendenhall's efforts and agree with the 
District Court that, when considered together , they amount 
to remarkable change. First, Mendenhall's work with 
probation was far above average. His supervising parole 
officer reported that during his supervised r elease, 
Mendenhall "performed admirably.""Admirable" is not 
synonymous with "average" or even "well." It connotes 
something distinct and exceptional. The Majority overlooks 
this highly complimentary statement altogether in 
assessing the merits of Mendenhall's conduct while on 
parole. 
 
Mendenhall's parole officer also stated that"based on Mr. 
Mendenhall's performance while on supervision, I would 
venture to opine that his criminal conduct is likely aberrant 
and is not likely to be repeated." The Majority fails to attach 
much, if any significance to this statement. W ithout 
explaining why, it quickly finds that "this statement hardly 
amounts to evidence of extraordinary rehabilitation." Again, 
I disagree. 
 
Given the dismal statistics regarding r ecidivism, the 
Parole Officer's observation and opinion indicates 
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something truly unique and remarkable. It demonstrates 
that Mendenhall did not just comply with the r equirements 
of his parole and avoid violations. Mor e importantly, he 
displayed a sincere, genuine desire to change his life. This 
conduct and earnestness, although the highest goal of 
corrections, is unfortunately rare among convicted 
offenders. Mendenhall left a marked impr ession on the 
parole officer. I accept the District Court's finding that 
Mendenhall's behavior was exceptional. 
 
Next, I believe Mendenhall's pursuit of architecture 
reflects a "real, positive change in behavior." A letter from 
his current employer states that Mendenhall"accepts 
responsibility and deadlines, has shown integrity, and has 
a true desire to increase his professional skills and become 
a fully licensed architect. His talent, moral ethic, and 
people skills would make Nolan hard to r eplace." 
Mendenhall did not begrudgingly change careers. Rather, 
he approached his new job with a positive attitude and 
worked hard to achieve success. This was not r equired by 
the criminal justice delivery system. Mendenhall's success, 
not only his work-product but also his workplace 
relationships, reflects an inner desir e and a commitment to 
move forward with his life and to do so in a moral, lawful 
manner. His attitude indicates extraor dinary rehabilitative 
efforts. 
 
Finally, Mendenhall's participation in therapy exemplifies 
the exceptional nature of his rehabilitation. For example, 
Mendenhall initiated therapy sessions on his own, without 
any prompting from the court. He did this because he 
wanted to "improve his marriage, his ability to be a better 
father, and to learn from his mistakes that he had made in 
the past." Additionally, Mendenhall began therapy before he 
knew that he faced resentencing, thus demonstrating his 
sincerity. As his therapist stated, "[w]orking with forensic 
populations on a frequent basis, I was impr essed that he 
voluntarily came forth, willing to examine his past patterns 
of behavior at a time in which there did not seem to be a 
compelling need to impress a judge or other sentencing 
authority." Moreover, Mendenhall did not merely show up 
for therapy. He was an active participant, willing to work 
through difficult issues and examine his conduct. In 
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essence, he recognized that he needed help, and took 
responsibility for his actions. His therapist described him 
as "genuinely motivated to become a more moral and 
effective person and to forever avoid situations that have 
historically proven to be high risk" and as someone who "is 
concerned about morals and the implications of his 
conduct." 
 
Despite these accolades, the Majority summarily 
concludes that there is no evidence to suggest that 
counseling was "somehow present to an extraordinary 
degree in this case." In my view, this minimizes 
Mendenhall's participation and achievements in therapy 
and fails to appreciate the important distinction between 
openly engaging in therapy and merely showing up with old 
attitudes intact. Many offenders do the latter in order to 
meet a requirement; they "fake it to make it" without any 
intention of looking inward and questioning their behavior. 
Mendenhall did just the opposite. If his efforts were not 
outside of, or beyond, the ordinary then I am not certain 
what is. Accordingly, I conclude that Mendenhall's 
voluntary participation in therapy, coupled with his 
"admirable" conduct on parole and in his new job, amount 
to extraordinary rehabilitation. 
 
Similar to Mendenhall, I also think that Yeaman has 
made "concrete gains toward tur ning his life around." The 
Majority acknowledges that Yeaman's conduct was 
commendable but nonetheless rejects a finding of 
extraordinary rehabilitation. In my view, the Majority 
overlooks the unique nature of Yeaman's accomplishments 
and sets the threshold for extraordinary r ehabilitation too 
high. First, Yeaman went "above and beyond" what was 
required of him in prison. Aside fr om being a "model 
prisoner" with no discipline record, Y eaman became actively 
involved in the prison community and focused his energies 
upon helping others. For example, he joined the prison 
choir and completed Spanish, public speaking courses, and 
other college courses. Moreover, he tutored inmates who 
spoke only Spanish. Additionally, Yeaman consistently 
received outstanding performance r eviews for his work as a 
janitor. His reviews also reveal that Yeaman had a positive 
attitude while incarcerated. 
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Yeaman's letters to family and friends r eflect his desire to 
help others while incarcerated. For example, in one letter, 
he explained: 
 
       It has been exactly one month since I . . . pr esented 
       myself for incarceration. It seems bizarr e to me that I'm 
       a `prisoner.' Rather, I've adopted the philosophy that 
       I'm a `volunteer.' I can leave really anytime I want to, 
       yet I'm an inmate. Since I'm a volunteer, I then believe 
       that I should do the best at whatever I'm supposed to 
       be volunteering to do. Most of the inmates spend a lot 
       of time hiding from the prison guards and doing the 
       least amount of work possible. I believe that r egardless 
       of the terms of my employment, I should do the best 
       that I can. 
 
J.A. at 365. In another letter, he stated: 
 
       As it turns out this is a period of reflection; of 
       redirecting one's life and contemplating one's future. 
       From that standpoint, this experience has been good 
       for me. And, to the extent that I am able to help others 
       do the same, it is also good. So, the time is passing 
       very quickly now and I am very involved in meeting 
       people and participating in activities. 
 
J.A. at 367. 
 
Helping others in the prison setting is certainly not 
mandatory. Indeed, active, positive involvement in the 
prison community is rare. In United States v. Bradstreet, 
207 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit recognized how uncommon it is for prison 
inmates to focus their efforts on educating others. In that 
case, the Court affirmed a downward departure for 
extraordinary rehabilitation because, compared with other 
inmates whose efforts were focused on self-improvement, 
the defendant's efforts were substantially concerned with 
others as well. See Bradstreet, 207 F .3d at 83. We have 
never held that assisting and educating others may serve as 
a basis for extraordinary rehabilitation. I would. I think 
such conduct falls within the general definition of 
extraordinary rehabilitation that we set forth in United 
States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76 (3d Cir . 1997). That is, it 
reflects a "truly repentant defendant[ ]" who has a 
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"demonstrated commitment to repair and to r ebuild [his] 
li[fe]." Sally, 116 F.3d at 80. Accordingly, I believe that 
Yeaman's "volunteer" approach, i.e., his efforts to help 
Spanish-speaking inmates learn English and his positive 
presence and involvement in the prison community, 
demonstrate remarkable strides toward changing his life. 
 
Next, Yeaman's shift in attitude during his prison stay 
also supports a finding of extraordinary r ehabilitation. In 
letters to family and friends, Yeaman r ecognized his own 
shortcomings and accepted responsibility for his actions. 
Further, he expressed a desire to change his life. He stated: 
 
       Shortly after I got here, I was told by most of the 
       inmates various ways to get through the system with 
       minimal work and not antagonizing the Prison staf f. I 
       questioned myself about how I was going to feel about 
       myself under such circumstances and decided that if 
       nothing else, I wanted to come out of here with more 
       integrity that I came in with. I wasn't going to let the 
       system create a scenario where I compr omised my 
       values to become like someone's expectations of me. 
 
J.A. at 366. 
 
Yeaman also began cooperating with the United States 
Government for the first time. In the past, Yeaman "butted 
heads with the United States Government, and .. . tested 
the regulators in Washington and thr oughout the country 
continually." J.A. at 171. However, after his conviction, he 
accepted the government's authority. Along with his 
conduct in prison, I think Yeaman's change in attitude also 
supports a finding of rehabilitation. 
 
The Majority believes that Yeaman's attitude and 
behavior did not significantly improve. It r easons that 
Yeaman is a man of strong religious convictions and thus 
his attitudes and behaviors during his incar ceration and 
supervised release could be reasonably expected. I disagree.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Majority's reasoning suggests that, as a defendant's level of 
insight, capability, and skill prior to conviction increase, his chances 
of 
achieving post-conviction "extraordinary r ehabilitation" decrease, 
because rehabilitative efforts ar e "expected" from such a defendant. 
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Although Yeaman professed strong r eligious beliefs before 
his conviction and incarceration, he did not apply them in 
his own life. He committed a serious crime involving fraud 
and deceit. However, while in prison and after his release, 
Yeaman demonstrated a genuine commitment to moral 
principles and values. He is living his life dif ferently than 
he did before his incarceration. He has not violated the 
terms of his supervised release and is now successfully 
managing a cattle ranch. This sort of notable change 
should not be underestimated. In this case, it indicates an 
extraordinary effort at rehabilitation. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that a sentencing court has 
broad discretion in determining whether to grant a 
downward departure, because it alone has the full flavor of 
the trial or plea, and all prior proceedings. Thus, it can 
gauge the full effect of its sentences upon of fender and 
victim alike. As the Supreme Court stated:"A district 
court's decision to depart from the Guidelines . . . will in 
most cases be due to substantial deference, for it embodies 
the traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court." 
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 
2046 (1996). Applying this deferential standar d to the 
present case, I think the circumstances r elied upon by the 
District Court are well within the "outside permissible 
limits" of extraordinary rehabilitation and are 
commensurate with circumstances "found exceptional in 
existing case law." United v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 772 (3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thus, under the Majority's rationale, less tr oubled defendants need to do 
more to reach the goal of extraor dinary rehabilitation than defendants 
with few to no skills and highly negative attitudes and behaviors. In my 
view, this approach unfairly punishes the for mer. A defendant's positive 
behaviors and strengths prior to conviction do not negate his 
postconviction "commitment to repair and r ebuild" his life or render his 
postconviction behavorial changes less real or significant. Our 
"definition" of extraordinary rehabilitation simply requires a "truly 
repentant defendant" who has made "concr ete gains toward turning his 
life around." Sally, 116 F.3d at 81. Yeaman and Mendenhall have 
demonstrated the requisite gains for extraor dinary rehabilitation. 
Indeed, 
the record shows that it is highly unlikely that they will commit another 
crime. This type of rehabilitation is extraor dinary for any criminal to 
achieve, regardless of his previous background. 
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Cir. 2000). As noted above, both Yeaman and Mendenhall 
distinguished themselves from other inmates and took 
concrete steps toward changing their lives. Therefore, I do 
not think the District Court abused its discr etion by 
departing downward for extraordinary r ehabilitation. 
 
The Majority had no need to address the extent of the 
District Court's departures because it r ejected 
extraordinary rehabilitation altogether . Because I think a 
departure is permissible, I will briefly discuss my views on 
the penological reasonableness of the court's departure. 
 
We have long been guided by the standar d of 18 U.S.C.A. 
S 3742(e)(3), which directs a District Court to impose a 
sentence "sufficient but not greater than necessary, to 
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection." Paragraph (2), in turn, lists four purposes of 
sentencing, which include the need: 
 
       (A) to reflect the seriousness of the of fense, to promote 
       respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for 
       the offense; 
 
       (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
 
       (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
       defendant; and 
 
       (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 
       vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
       treatment in the most effective manner . 
 
Id. S 3553(a)(2). I believe we should return to the purposes 
of sentencing, and attempt to make sense of what we are 
trying to accomplish whenever we are called upon to review 
a sentence, or as here, determine whether the extent of a 
court's sentencing departure was reasonable. 
 
The first purpose of sentencing is to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, promote r espect for the law, and 
to provide just punishment. In this case, we have empirical 
evidence that this purpose has been met. The sentence and 
time already served have brought about a r emarkable 
rehabilitation in these two individuals, who ar e now leading 
exemplary lives. The evidence of record indicates that they 
have indeed developed a respect for the law. Both Yeaman 
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and Mendenhall exhibited model behavior while confined, 
took steps to change their careers, accepted r esponsibility 
for their illicit conduct, and sincerely apologized. If all 
offenders left confinement as these two have, we could fold 
our tents. A criminal justice delivery system could not hope 
for better results. 
 
The second purpose of sentencing is to affor d adequate 
deterrence to criminal conduct. Yeaman and Mendenhall 
have already served time. They have been punished. 
Sending them back to prison for a longer ter m would not 
enhance the deterrent effect of their original sentences. It is 
widely recognized that the duration of incarceration 
provides little or no general deterrence for white collar 
crimes. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the 
Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of 
Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL S TUD. 1, 12 (Jan. 1999). For 
individuals committing these types of crimes, the 
probability of being apprehended and incar cerated is a 
powerful deterrent in of itself, because the "disutility of 
being in prison at all and the stigma and loss of earning 
power may depend relatively little on the length of 
imprisonment." Id. at 12 (suggesting that"less than- 
maximal sanctions, combined with relatively high 
probabilities of apprehension" is "optimal" for white collar 
crimes). Thus, there is not a scintilla of evidence here that 
longer sentences will deter anyone from committing mail 
and wire fraud.2 It is mer e speculation. Hence, I cannot say 
the District Court abused its discretion byfinding that this 
condition was met. 
 
The third purpose of sentencing is to pr otect the public 
from further crimes by the defendant. In this case, there is 
absolutely no evidence that either Yeaman or Mendenhall 
would commit further crimes. Indeed, here we have expert 
opinion to the contrary, stating that this behavior is "not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. I cannot help noting in the margin that upon Robert Downey Jr.'s re- 
arrest following a year's sentence in prison, he said "[t]he threat of 
prison 
has been eliminated for me. I know I can do time now." Claudia Puig & 
Kelly Carter, Are Awards Good for Downey? Hollywood's Attention May 
Not Help Actor Kick Drug Habit, U.S.A. T oday, March 15, 2001, at D1. So 
much for punishment and prison as a deterrent! 
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likely to be repeated." And as explained above, Yeaman's 
and Mendenhall's rehabilitative efforts were extraordinary: 
They did more than "they were supposed to do" and made 
"concrete gains toward `turning [their lives] around.' " Sally, 
116 F.3d at 81. Based upon their recor ds and the evidence 
in this case, the most likely conclusion is that Y eaman and 
Mendenhall will never commit fraud or any other crime 
again. 
 
The fourth goal of sentencing is to provide needed 
educational or vocational training, medical car e, or other 
correctional treatment in the most ef fective manner. No one 
even argues that Yeaman or Mendenhall need such 
services. 
 
I believe that a departure serves the historical, 
penological, and statutory purposes of sentencing, even as 
set forth in the Guidelines. Yet, under the Majority's 
mandate, Yeaman and Mendenhall will be r eturned to 
prison, perhaps for as many as four years-- at a cost to 
the U.S. taxpayer of roughly a quarter of a million dollars. 
To me this case illustrates the sheer folly and utter 
nonsense of offense-based theory, and the need to use 
corrections-based sentencing. There is not a shred of 
evidence that either Yeaman or Mendenhall need re- 
incarceration. No penologist could hope for better results 
from the criminal justice delivery system than these 
repentant, rehabilitated, and now fully functioning and 
productive individuals. 
 
In closing, I find the quote from Pope's An Essay on 
Criticism, a bit ironic. See Maj. Op. fn. 6. The full strain of 
Pope's quote, however, is instructive. It r eads: 
 
       Good nature and good sense must ever join, 
       To err is human, to forgive, divine. 
 
Because it is human to err, we must employ our good sense 
and nature, and rise to forgiveness. I cannot see that we 
have. If ever there is a place where good nature and good 
sense are not conjoined, it is in the U.S. Sentencing 
Guideline scheme-- a mechanical construct that is devoid 
of feeling. Forgiveness could not possibly have been a 
flicker in its framers' eyes. One of the primary goals of 
sentencing outlined in Section 3742(e)(3) is to"provide just 
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punishment for the offense." But, law divor ced from 
common sense is seldom just. In my view, this case is no 
exception. 
 
Hence, I respectfully submit this concurr ence and 
dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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